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Reflected Appraisal Through a 21st Century Looking Glass 
 The concept of reflected appraisal—also known as reflected self-appraisal or the looking-
glass self—refers to the processes by which peoples' self-views are influenced by their 
perceptions of how others view them.1 Reflected appraisal is reflected in the metaphor that 
people use others as a mirror, i.e. looking glass, for judging themselves, and also in the sense that 
others' judgments are reflected in self-judgments. The concept refers simultaneously to Person 
A's self-appraisal and Person A's appraisal of Person B's appraisal of Person A. These appraisals 
exert reciprocal influence: Self-views affect judgments of others' views, and judgments of others' 
views affect self-views. In short, reflected appraisal can be viewed as a cycle of mutually 
influential judgments.2  
 Psychologists, sociologists, and communication scholars have routinely acknowledged 
the role of reflected appraisal in self-concept development since James (1890), Cooley (1902), 
and Mead (1934) articulated its importance. The volume of published studies offering direct or 
indirect evidence for reflected appraisal is overwhelming. Mere correlation between the content 
of self-views held and social feedback received could be construed as evidence for reflected 
appraisal, but one need not rely on correlational data to conclude that perceptions of others' 
appraisals can influence self-perception. Many experiments that have randomly assigned 
participants to receive social feedback have reported whether self-appraisals changed as a result 
of such feedback, and a subset of these studies also report perceptions of others' perspectives that 
may have mediated feedback-induced self-concept change. Such sources of reflected appraisal 
evidence are often modestly framed as manipulation checks designed to show that feedback had 
the intended impact. We assume that the volume of published studies offering direct or indirect 
evidence for reflected appraisal is considerably larger than the already impressive number of 
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studies that explicitly address reflected appraisal, because researchers now have little incentive to 
call attention to basic replications of reflected appraisal phenomena that have long been taken for 
granted.  
 Reviews of reflected appraisal research have previously been published (e.g., Felson, 
1993; Lundgren, 2004; Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1979; Tice & Wallace, 2003), but most have 
either been sidebars in papers written to address other issues or have focused narrowly on one 
subcomponent of reflected appraisal. For this chapter, we sought to extend the reflected appraisal 
literature by offering an up-to-date review of empirical evidence relevant to each stage of the 
reflected appraisal cycle. We start by analyzing people's impressions of others' impressions of 
them, then examine how impressions of others influence self-views. We conclude by 
highlighting challenges faced by reflected appraisal researchers and considering how new 
technology is changing the study and nature of reflected appraisal.  
Perceptions of Others' Appraisals 
 The stage of reflected appraisal in which people form subjective impressions of others' 
views of them is commonly called metaperception.3 When discussing the psychological 
consequences of reflected appraisal, one is obliged to clarify that the process is driven by the 
perception of others' views, which may or may not resemble the reality of others' views. The 
theme of disconnection between metaperception and reality has been revisited often in reflected 
appraisal research (e.g., Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1979). Myriad factors can undermine 
individuals' empathic accuracy, i.e., their ability to correctly imagine others' perspectives (Ickes, 
1997). Metaperception usually requires making inferences based on an incomplete, ambiguous 
set of cues. Assessing how one is viewed by other people is easy only to the extent that others 
communicate their perspective clearly, directly, and honestly. Of course, people generally avoid 
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revealing the details of their appraisals to the people they appraise, especially if the details could 
be hurtful or offensive (Blumberg, 1972; DePaulo & Bell, 1996).  
 The mere availability of cues that convey the perspective of another does not guarantee 
that person perceivers will use them (O'Conner & Dyce, 1993). One explanation relates to 
individuals' limited ability and motivation to attend to and reflect upon relevant available 
information about other people. For example, the act of intentionally managing the impression 
one presents to others diverts attention that could otherwise be focused on noting others' 
responses (e.g., Baumeister, Hutton, & Tice, 1989). Furthermore, the process of actively trying 
to understand others can encourage top-down information processing, causing tunnel vision (e.g., 
Gilbert, Jones, & Pelham, 1987; Gilbert & Krull, 1988). Even when people receive and pay 
attention to concrete evidence about others' views of them, they may still reject or minimize the 
importance of this information if it conflicts with their expectations (e.g., Jones, 1986) and 
preferences (e.g., Sanitioso & Wlodarski, 2004).  
Self-appraisals steer metaperceptions 
 To convey the difficulty of deducing others’ views, Shrauger and Shoeneman (1979) 
adopted the phrase "through a looking glass darkly" to emphasize the opaqueness of the looking 
glass. However, as Murray, Holmes, MacDonald, and Ellsworth (1998) recognized, the same 
phrase could also be used to describe the excessive pessimism that characterizes some people's 
metaperceptions. Consistent with self-consistency models of self-evaluation, individuals with 
chronically low or insecure self-esteem sometimes struggle to accept evidence that others really 
do think well of them (e.g., Campbell, Simpson, Boldry, & Kashy, 2005; Lemay & Dudley, 
2009; McNulty, 2008; Murray, Holmes, Griffin, Bellavia, & Rose, 2001). As Murray, Rose, 
Bellavia, Holmes, and Kusche (2002) put it, people with low self-esteem are more likely to 
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"make mountains out of molehills" by assuming that minor criticisms from others signal overall 
negative appraisals. Moreover, the social norm of communicating compliments while 
withholding criticism magnifies the impact of critical feedback that does get expressed and can 
even lead people to perceive neutral social feedback as negative (e.g., Leary, Haupt, Strausser, & 
Chokel, 1998).  
 Still, people who underestimate the positivity of others' impressions of them seem to be 
more the exception than the rule. The self-enhancement bias that pervades self-evaluations (e.g., 
see research on optimistic bias and better-than-average effects described in Alicke’s chapter in 
this volume) is also evident in metaperceptions—especially when the risk of encountering 
disconfirming evidence is minimal (Preuss & Alicke, 2009). Most people have positive overall 
self-esteem (Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989) and are prone to self-flattering interpretations of 
social feedback (see review by Baumeister, 1998). For example, Murray and colleagues showed 
that high self-esteem individuals respond to esteem-threatening events by increasing their 
confidence in others' positive views of them (Murray, Griffin, Rose, & Bellavia, 2003; Murray et 
al., 1998). Even unbiased person perceivers should tend to overestimate others' opinion of them 
simply because positive appraisals are more commonly expressed than negative appraisals 
(DePaulo & Bell, 1996). 
 The evidence just presented indicates that existing self-views affect interpretation of 
information regarding others' views, but sometimes self-views are the primary or only source of 
metaperceptions, not merely a filter. An impressive body of evidence indicates that 
metaperception, like other categories of social judgment, often relies more on egocentric 
projections of self-views than on assessments of external information (see reviews by Felson, 
1993; Krueger, 1998; 2007). Self-views can dominate judgments of others for several reasons. 
REFLECTED APPRAISAL                                                                                                          6 
 
Social cognition research has repeatedly demonstrated that chronically accessible self-views 
influence social judgments automatically and unconsciously (see review by Baldwin, 1992). 
Epley, Keysar, VanBoven, and Gilovich (2004) concluded that basing judgments of others' views 
on self-views constitutes the first stage of the perspective taking process—an initial default 
judgment that can be overridden only if circumstances allow and encourage more thorough 
information processing. Mere awareness of one's own views can interfere with one's ability to 
correctly gauge others' perspectives (Chambers, Epley, Savitsky, & Windschitl, 2008). Moreover, 
people can justify interjecting self-views into judgments of others' views because they assume 
that others share their views. The false consensus effect describes the tendency for people to 
overestimate the overlap between their views and those of others (Marks & Miller, 1987; Ross, 
Greene, & House, 1977). People are also prone to the illusion of transparency—overestimating 
the extent to which their feelings are evident to others (Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998), 
especially if they feel self-conscious (Vorauer & Ross, 1999).  
 Although the impact of self-views on metaperceptions is typically large, it is not 
inevitable. People are less likely to assume that another person shares their views when the other 
person is noticeably different from them (Kenny & DePaulo, 1993), an outgroup member 
(Clement & Krueger, 2002; Frey & Tropp, 2006), or someone who is not emotionally close 
(Ames, 2004a, b). People are also more apt to take a systematic, bottom-up approach to evidence 
analysis in judging other people’s views of them, rather than relying on self-views or other 
judgment heuristics, if they think the judgment is relevant to their personal future (Kaplan, 
Santuzzi, & Ruscher, 2009). In general, if information about others' views is salient and 
unambiguous, people are more likely to use it when assessing others, rather than to rely only on 
self-views or other heuristics (e.g., Baron, Albright, & Malloy, 1995; Jussim, Soffin, Brown, Ley, 
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& Kohlhepp, 1992). Perspective-taking aids can also reduce self-projection in metaperception: 
Albright and Malloy (1999) showed that participants' metaperception accuracy improved if they 
were first shown a videotape of their own behavior.  
Metaperception accuracy 
 In the past 25 years, measurement and statistical innovations have allowed researchers to 
assess metaperception accuracy with more sophistication. In their seminal review of this topic, 
Kenny and DePaulo (1993) concluded that individuals can judge how people in general view 
them with reasonable accuracy, but they overestimate the uniformity of others' views because 
they cannot accurately distinguish the perspectives of specific other people. This perspective fits 
well with the notion of the "generalized other" proposed by Mead (1934). The generalized other 
concept assumes that reflected appraisal processes are insensitive to differences between others' 
appraisals—other people get lumped together into a collective whole, so it does not matter 
whether the metaperceptions driving the reflected appraisal process are judgments of the views 
of one person or many people (see discussion by Felson, 1989).  
 More recent studies have confirmed people's ability to recognize how most others view 
them, but several have also determined that people are sometimes quite capable of judging the 
views of specific others (e.g., Carlson & Furr, 2009; Levesque, 1997; Oltmanns, Gleason, 
Klonsky, & Turkheimer, 2005). At first glance, the notion that metaperception is often 
reasonably accurate (see Jussim, 1993; Jussim, Harber, Crawford, Cain, & Cohen, 2005 for 
endorsements of this perspective) might seem difficult to reconcile with the aforementioned 
evidence that multiple factors distort judgments of others' views. To an extent, debates about 
metaperception accuracy boil down to different interpretations of the same statistics—a 75% 
level of metaperception accuracy could be framed as an impressive or lousy performance. 
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Another explanation is that bringing attention to factors that challenge people’s ability to grasp 
others’ perspectives suggests that these factors undermine perspective taking more consistently 
and to a greater degree that is actually the case. In other words, accuracy in perspective taking 
might be typical, but the exceptions are compelling and therefore attract disproportionate 
research attention (see discussion by Jussim, 2005). Yet another possibility is that 
metaperception accuracy occurs despite people's reliance on self-views for judging others' views.  
 Although people exaggerate the extent of overlap between views of themselves and 
others, one could argue that people's social views on the whole tend to be more similar than 
different, at least regarding ingroup-relevant topics. This makes sense, because an individual's 
self-views are partly based on the same behavior and outcomes that determine others' views of 
that individual (Albright, Forest, & Reiseter, 2001; Chambers et al., 2008; Malloy, Albright, & 
Scarpati, 2007). If a person is viewed similarly by that person and by others, the same 
metaperceptions should result from either pure projections of self-views or from unbiased 
perspective taking. Metaperception accuracy should presumably be relatively high for judgments 
of self-dimensions that are tied to discrete, observable actions (e.g., basketball free-throw skill), 
and relatively low for more abstract self-dimensions (e.g., basketball court awareness). 
Considering the challenges involved in deciphering others' perspectives, using one's own 
perspective to estimate other people's perceptions may sometimes yield more reliably accurate 
judgments than trying to exercise empathy and carefully analyze external evidence (e.g.,  
DiDinato, Ullrich, & Krueger, 2011); however, this argument is challenged by evidence that 
people can be surprisingly clueless about their own strengths and weaknesses (Dunning, 2005).   
 In summary, research demonstrates that people's judgments of how others view them 
derive, at least in part, from extrapolation and imposition of existing self-views. Injecting one’s 
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own self-views into judgments of how one is viewed by others can compromise the accuracy of 
these judgments, yet people's assessments of how others view them seem to be fairly accurate 
despite or perhaps even because of this egocentrism. In the next section, we shift from examining 
how people's self-views influence metaperceptions to examining how people's self-views are 
influenced by metaperceptions.  
Effects of Metaperception on Self-perception 
 Self-concept change resulting from reflected appraisal may entail a fundamental shift in 
one's global self-appraisal, or it could be restricted to a minor, trivial subcomponent of the self-
concept. The point that self-appraisals can be influenced by perceptions of others' appraisals may 
seem obvious, 4 but the extent of this influence was probably underappreciated before Leary and 
colleagues introduced sociometer theory (Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & 
Downs, 1995). Sociometer theory offers a convincing explanation for why self-views are so 
susceptible to influence from perceptions of others' evaluations: People care about others' views 
because their good or bad feelings about themselves directly depend on how they think others 
feel about them. Individuals share a fundamental need for assurance of connection with people 
who accept them (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). The sociometer model asserts that self-esteem is 
essentially an index of perceived social acceptance. Even anticipating change to one's social 
acceptance status impacts self-appraisal (Leary et al., 1995). Self-esteem is particularly sensitive 
to negative metaperceptions that threaten minimum standards for belongingness; positive 
metaperceptions that merely reinforce one's sense of being accepted have relatively less impact 
on self-esteem (Leary et al., 1995; see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; 
Fenigstein, 1979 for more confirmation that negative social feedback packs more punch than 
positive feedback).5  
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 The process by which metaperceptions become integrated into one's self-concept is 
mostly automatic (for reviews, see Chen, Boucher, & Tapias, 2006; Higgins & Pittman, 2008). 
Baldwin, Carrell, and Lopez (1990) demonstrated this fact by showing that priming students to 
think about authority figures associated with disapproval (the Pope or the department chair) 
caused their self-views to become more negative. Additional evidence can be drawn from Shah's 
(2003a, b) finding that one person's exposure to other people's views about the goals that person 
should pursue caused that person's goals to shift automatically to fit other people's perspectives. 
Effects of exposure to others' appraisals extend beyond the window of time in which exposure 
occurred. For example, Weisbuch, Sinclair, Skorinko, and Eccleston (2009) showed that 
encountering an experimenter wearing a t-shirt promoting tolerance of different body sizes led 
female participants to experience higher state self-esteem when interacting with this 
experimenter (now wearing a message-free shirt) one week later.  
 The same self-affirmation and self-enhancement biases that guide the formation of 
metaperceptions are also evident in the integration of metaperceptions into self-views. People 
embrace and assimilate social feedback into self-views more rapidly if the feedback is consistent 
with their existing self-views and the implications are positive (e.g., Shrauger, 1975). People also 
selectively recall metaperception details that match or bolster preferred self-views (e.g., 
Sanitioso & Wlodarski, 2004). Swann, Bosson, and Pelham (2002) found that people can even 
expand the boundaries of their self-concepts to incorporate desirable social feedback. Choice of 
social environment provides a good example of how individuals can exert control over reflected 
appraisal outcomes. People want to feel good, or at least not feel bad, about themselves, so they 
choose to spend time with people who reinforce their current or ideal self-appraisals (e.g., 
McNulty & Swann, 1994; Swann & Read, 1981). Although much of the bias observed in 
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reflected appraisal is best characterized as automatic and passive, people also play an active role 
in shaping the reflected appraisal process, and to some degree they do so with awareness and 
intention. 
Moderators of and mediators of metaperception internalization 
 By definition, demonstrations of reflected appraisal effects highlight the instability and 
conditionality of people's self-appraisals. Reflected appraisal susceptibility indicates a self-
concept that is not fully formed, or at least not held with confidence. In general, research has 
linked self-concept instability and contingency with more psychological problems than benefits 
(e.g., Crocker, Luhtanen, & Sommers, 2004; Kernis, Paradise, Whitaker, Wheatman, & Goldman, 
2000). The same could be said for the psychological correlates of sensitivity to reflected 
appraisal. Perceptions of others' appraisals exert more influence on the self-appraisals of people 
who have low self-esteem (e.g., Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996), anxious avoidant attachment 
(e.g., Srivastava & Beer, 2005), a record of low achievement, (e.g., Madon, Jussim, & Eccles, 
1997), or stigmatized personal features (e.g., Cioffi, 2000; Khanna, 2010; Santuzzi & Ruscher, 
2002). The tendency for individuals with low self-esteem to make mountains out of molehills 
also applies to their response to critical social feedback (Murray et al., 2002). Compared to 
people with high self-esteem, people with low self-esteem have more difficulty confining the 
self-evaluative consequences of specific criticism to the narrow facets of self directly implicated 
by the feedback. Unfortunately, the people whose self-esteem fluctuates most dramatically with 
perceived social approval also tend to be evaluated less favorably by others (Harter, Stocker, & 
Robinson, 1996).  
 Cultural differences in the degree to which people’s self-concepts are affected by 
reflected appraisal have been observed, most notably in comparisons between collectivistic East 
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Asian cultures and individualistic Western cultures. Collectivism prioritizes interconnections 
between oneself and others, and Suh (2007) confirmed that self-views of East Asians are more 
contingent on perceptions of others' appraisals than self-views of individuals from Western 
cultures. In Suh's words, the "perspective of others very often becomes the default position of the 
East Asian self" (p. 1327). This conclusion dovetails with research showing that the Chinese are 
much better at perspective taking than Americans (Wu & Keysar, 2007). Heine, Takemoto, 
Moskalenko, Lasaleta, and Henrich (2008) found that Japanese participants were insensitive to 
the presence of a mirror that caused North American participants to become more self-aware, an 
outcome suggesting that North Americans are less accustomed to considering how they appear to 
others. People display more confidence in other people's ability to judge them if they live in East 
Asian cultures (Tafarodi, Lo, Yamaguchi, Lee, & Katsura, 2004) or report attitudes reflecting a 
collectivistic orientation (Vorauer & Cameron, 2002). This connection between individualism 
and the belief that others cannot accurately judge may help to explain the comparatively high 
levels of self-esteem found in Western cultures: Individualistic people should find it easier to 
rationalize their rejection of undesired social feedback.  
 Reflected appraisal outcomes partly depend on one’s perception of the other person’s 
characteristics. As Cooley (1902) proposed, perceptions of another person's appraisal are more 
likely to become assimilated into the self-concept if the other person is considered relevant, 
important, valued, desired, and an ingroup member (e.g., Cast, Stets, & Burke, 1999; Rosenberg, 
1973; Sinclair, Huntsinger, Skorinko, & Hardin, 2005; Turner & Onorato, 1999). Sinclair et al. 
(2005) found that pondering other people's appraisals could even push self-views in the opposite 
direction of others' appraisals if the other people were undesirable relationship partners. However, 
not all evidence neatly corresponds with the principle that reflected appraisals of important 
REFLECTED APPRAISAL                                                                                                          13 
 
others matter more. Harter (1999) confirmed that self-appraisals of children are most affected by 
perceived appraisals of their parents, but her finding that teens and adults are more affected by 
the appraisals of peers than family members or their closest friends is harder to square with other 
evidence regarding effects of metaperception target importance. Harter explained this apparent 
contradiction by speculating that people view the appraisals of their closest family and friends as 
biased and therefore less credible.  
 Metaperceptions can influence self-views directly or they can alter self-views indirectly 
by inducing behavior change. People adjust their behavior, whether strategically or 
unintentionally, in response to their sense of how others currently view them or in response to 
their expectations for how others will view them after observing the behavior.  People's 
perceptions of others' appraisals of their capabilities automatically affect their goal setting, 
performance, and responses to performance outcomes (Shah, 2003a, b). The impact of people's 
metaperceptions on their behavior is best exemplified by research on self-fulfilling prophecy and 
stereotype threat. Self-fulfilling prophecy describes how receiving information about others' 
expectations of them can cause people to behave in a manner that confirms others' expectations 
(see reviews by Jussim & Harber, 2005; Rosenthal & Rubin, 1978). Stereotype threat refers to 
fear of confirming negative stereotypes about the abilities of one’s group—a fear that often 
undermines performance, thus confirming the stereotype (see review by Schmader, Johns, & 
Forbes, 2008). Explanations of self-fulfilling prophecy generally emphasize that internalization 
of others' expectancies precedes expectancy-confirming behavior, which reinforces the 
internalization process. In contrast, the stereotype threat literature emphasizes that when negative 
stereotypes regarding the capabilities of some group are made salient, members of that group 
generally underachieve whether they accept the validity of the stereotype or not.6  
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 The behavior that metaperceptions influence can affect self-appraisals through self-
perception or by causing metaperceptions to change. Self-perception, the process by which one’s 
self-appraisals adjust according to the implications of one's own behavior, can partly be 
explained by people's preference for self-consistency, but this explanation alone cannot account 
for evidence that people are more likely to internalize their behavior when it was also observed 
by other people (Kelly & Rodriguez, 2006; Schlenker, Dlugolecki, & Doherty, 1994; Tice, 1992). 
People often behave in ways that conflict with personal attitudes and values, but public 
commitment to such behavior dramatically increases the consequences for their self-concept—
especially if the audience is perceived to have a personal interest in the behavior (Harter, 1999; 
Pasupathi & Rich, 2005). People have reason to recognize or at least assume that observers tend 
to attribute behavior to the stable personal qualities of the individual engaging in the behavior, 
rather than viewing the behavior as an abberation or as the product of forces outside of the 
individual (see review by Gilbert & Malone, 1995). Indeed, when people disclose unflattering 
personal information or publicly humiliate themselves, they usually overestimate the negative 
impact on others’ views of them (e.g., Gromet & Pronin, 2009). Therefore, engaging in 
uncharacteristic behavior may cause people to amend their judgment of an observer’s appraisal 
of them, which may in turn cause them to change their self-views. In short, metaperception can 
shape behavior, which in turn can shape metaperception.   
 The real-world consequences of the connections between metaperceptions and behavior, 
as well as the outcomes of self-appraisals, could potentially be profound. For example, Murray 
and colleagues have shown that the actions of people who view their partners with rose colored 
glasses elevate their partner's self-appraisals, which in turn promotes behavior worthy of positive 
appraisal (e.g., Murray et al., 1996). Murray's findings have been extended by research on the 
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Michelangelo effect (Drigotas, Rusbult, Wieselquist, & Whitton, 1999), which describes the 
process by which close relationship partners shape each other's behavior and self-appraisals 
toward desired ideals. The Michelangelo effect essentially highlights a form of self-fulfilling 
prophecy—treating others as if they possessed the traits that you wished they had actually leads 
others to feel that they possess those traits and to engage in behavior consistent with the desired 
traits.  
 Kelly's (2000) research on secret disclosure in psychotherapy provides another example 
of how reflected appraisal effects can be mediated by people’s behavior. Kelly's work suggests 
that people routinely withhold shameful secrets from their therapist in order to project a more 
positive self-image. By restricting negative self-disclosure, people can more easily accept that 
their therapist truly holds them in high regard and has positive expectations for their future (see 
also Lemay & Clark, 2008). Although hiding personal information from others has been linked 
with negative psychological outcomes in some contexts (e.g., Uysal, Lin, & Knee, 2010), Kelly 
(2000) concluded that downsides of avoiding full self-disclosure in therapy may be offset by 
advantages associated with people’s ability to internalize their positive self-presentation and their 
perception of being viewed positively by their therapist.  
 In summary, research confirms that metaperceptions change self-views directly or by 
inducing behavior that people internalize. When self-views change, the cycle of reflected 
appraisal repeats: Change in self-appraisal is likely to produce change in people's 
metaperceptions.  
Research Challenges and Opportunities 
 Studying reflected appraisal presents several challenges. Perhaps the biggest is the fact 
that reflected appraisal is not one but rather an interlocking series of processes (see Figure 1). To 
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date, most of the empirical evidence relevant to reflected appraisal has emerged from studies 
designed to test hypotheses relevant to a single component of reflected appraisal. Capturing the 
nuances of each element of the reflected appraisal cycle for all participants in a single study is 
impractical, if not implausible, but the lack of such studies leaves open the possibility that the 
reality of reflected appraisal as a whole could be different than the sum of evidence from studies 
addressing narrow slices of reflected appraisal would indicate.   
 Reflected appraisal researchers also face methodological challenges in trying to 
distinguish between competing explanations for outcomes observed. For example, as discussed 
earlier, mere correspondence between self-appraisals and metaperceptions could reflect 
judgments of oneself influencing judgments of others, judgments of others influencing 
judgments of oneself, or independent judgments of oneself and others. Another challenge is 
distinguishing the influence of others' real or perceived appraisals on self-appraisal from self-
broadcasting—the influence of self-appraisal on others' appraisals (see discussions by Felson, 
1993; Kenny & DePaulo, 1993; Srivastava & Beer, 2005). Moreover, it is not always easy to 
isolate reflected appraisal effects from less complex, more direct sources of social influence such 
as social comparison, mimicry (e.g., Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001), and perceived self-other 
overlap (e.g., Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991).  
 The fact that multiple mechanisms can account for the impact of one's social environment 
on self-views raises the question of whether reflected appraisal plays a relatively major or minor 
role when compared with alternative forms of social influence. Sedikides and Skowronski (1995) 
determined that social comparisons influenced self-appraisals more than reflected appraisal, but 
the reality of reflected appraisal has never really been challenged, at least not when reflected 
appraisal definitions specify that subjective perceptions of others drive the process. People seem 
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to believe that reflected appraisal is an important factor in their self-appraisals (Harter et al., 
1996). In recent years, some businesses have begun trying to increase their employees' 
productivity and psychological health through the use of reflected appraisal interventions such as 
the "360 degree exercise" or the "reflected best self exercise" that encourage participants to 
understand their strengths by viewing themselves through the perspective of their peers (e.g., 
Roberts, Dutton, Spreitzer, Heaphy, & Quinn, 2005).   
  It may be a cliché to note that rapidly improving neuroscience techniques hold high 
promise for enhancing knowledge of psychological processes, but neuroscience has already 
advanced reflected appraisal research. An examination of the neurological underpinnings of 
reflected appraisal is beyond the scope of this chapter, but a study by Pfeifer et al. (2009) offers 
an example of how neuroscience can help. Prior research had established that teens were 
sensitive to reflected appraisal (e.g., Harter et al., 1996), but had not directly compared reflected 
appraisal for teens and adults. Pfeifer et al. used functional magnetic resonance imaging to probe 
the brain activity of adult and adolescent samples during a self-reflection task. They found that 
teen brains showed significantly more activity than adult brains in the area at the intersection of 
the inferior parietal lobule and posterior superior temporal gyrus—a brain region that has been 
linked with third-person perspective-taking. This evidence allowed Pfeifer et al. to conclude that 
reflected appraisal does indeed affect the self-appraisals of adolescents more than adults.  
Internet-mediated reflected appraisal 
 Having established that technology innovations can benefit the study of reflected 
appraisal, we now consider the intriguing possibility that one relatively new technology—the 
internet—has already significantly changed reflected appraisal processes and outcomes. For the 
first time in history, face-to-face interaction now is not necessarily the dominant means by which 
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people assess and are assessed by others (Zhao, 2006). The telephone reduced people's reliance 
on face-to-face communication, but the emergence of the internet has truly been a game changer 
for social interaction. People now routinely use computers to present themselves and provide 
feedback to others via personal webpages, e-mail, and—to an increasing degree—social 
networking sites. In 2010, Americans were spending a greater percentage of internet time using 
social networking sites and blogs than e-mail (23% vs. 8%; Nielsen, 2010). The Pew Research 
Center reported that nearly three-quarters of the teens and young adults in the world with internet 
access were using social networking sites in 2009  (Lenhart, Purcell, Smith, & Zickuhr, 2010) . It 
also found that 55% of adults aged 18-25 visited social networking sites at least once a day 
(Taylor & Keeter, 2010). Researchers have not had enough time to fully grasp the psychological 
consequences of the movement toward electronic social networking (partly because the favored 
mode of internet communication keeps changing), but we suspect that Zhao (2005) was on target 
in observing that internet communication partners “constitute a distinctive 'looking glass' that 
produces a 'digital self' that differs from the self formed offline" (p. 387).  
 The internet gives people the ability to elicit and gather social feedback around the clock. 
Pew Research found that 83% of young adults report always keeping their cellphones (which 
today typically offer text message if not internet capability) within arm’s length when sleeping  
(Taylor & Keeter, 2010). The increasing extent to which people are connected to social feedback 
raises the possibility that people's self-views may be more affected by reflected appraisal now 
than they used to be. Before cell phone and internet use became common, researchers 
(Schoeneman, 1981; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1995) concluded that self-concept is more 
strongly influenced by self-reflection than reflected appraisal. But when these studies were 
conducted, self-reflection had less competition. Today, instead of engaging in self-reflection 
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during moments of downtime, people may choose instead to call or text a friend, or log on to the 
internet.  
 Different channels of internet communication could have different implications for 
reflected appraisal, but we will focus on the compelling example of the Facebook social 
networking website. At this point in time, Facebook is by far the most popular option for 
computer-mediated communication, with 500 million users (Facebook, 2011). One longitudinal 
diary study found that students at an American college spent an average of 30 minutes per day on 
Facebook (Pempek, Yermolayeva, & Calvert, 2009). Facebook users create self-descriptive 
personal profile homepages that they link to the profiles of other Facebook users (linked users 
are called "friends" in Facebook lingo). When Facebook users log on, they can easily view 
others' profile updates and new messages sent. Facebook privacy settings allow users to decline 
another user's request to be linked as a friend, or to remove a link to an existing friend, but the 
fact that Facebook users are commonly linked to more than 200 friends (e.g., Pempek et al., 
2009; Tong, van der Heide, Langwell, & Walther, 2008) hints that users are often not 
particularly selective in filtering friend requests.  
The flattering Facebook looking glass 
 Facebook-mediated reflected appraisal probably differs from traditional paths of reflected 
appraisal in a number of ways, but in our view the most important difference is that Facebook 
appears more likely to promote positive self-appraisals by allowing people to present their 
preferred self-image, cultivate a large network of "friends," and dodge signs of others' negative 
appraisals. To be sure, like any communication medium, Facebook can and has been used as a 
tool for hurting other people. But on the whole, the features and norms of Facebook promote 
self-esteem bolstering more than bashing.  
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 From a self-presentation standpoint, communicating through Facebook rather than during 
live interactions allows people more opportunities to subtly craft their public identity through 
written communications and by selectively displaying photos and links to favored people, places, 
and things (Gonzalez & Hancock, 2011; Zhao, Grasmuch, & Martin, 2008). Internet self-
presentation is rarely blatantly untruthful (e.g., Back et al., 2010; Bargh, McKenna, & Fitzsimons, 
2002), but it surely involves selective disclosure. Zhao et al. (2008) found that all of the 60 
college student Facebook pages they studied projected a socially desirable identity.  
 Because Facebook enhances users' ability to project a positive impression of themselves, 
they have reason to expect their Facebook friends to think well of them. Although observers who 
form impressions of Facebook users discount forms of self-presentation that can easily be 
manipulated (Walther, 2009), impression managers are likely to assume that others accept the 
details of their self-presentation at face value. This assumption is bolstered by evidence that 
people overestimate the degree to which their e-mail messages achieve their communication 
goals (Kruger, Epley, Parker, & Ng, 2005), and pre-Facebook evidence that owners of personal 
webpages judge that others form more positive impressions of them by viewing their webpage 
than through face-to-face interaction (Sherman et al., 2001).   
 Facebook not only allows people to boost their self-esteem by internalizing the 
complimentary self-presentations they craft, but it also gives people chronic access to self-
affirming feedback from others. We have already discussed how social norms in general 
encourage people to express their positive views of others but not their criticisms, but internet 
social network environments may stack the deck even further in favor of positive social feedback. 
One reason why users of Facebook and other social networking sites may expect to receive 
flattering social feedback relates to the previously mentioned ability of users to regulate their 
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communications to fit their sense of what would be socially appropriate or advantageous. Just as 
Facebook users have the power to present themselves to others in ways that emphasize personal 
strengths, other users also have the ability to hide their real feelings if expressing them could be 
hurtful or counterproductive. In real-time face-to-face interactions, suppressing knee-jerk 
expressions of negative feelings (annoyance, disgust, frustration, etc.) toward others or their 
actions should be more difficult to manage. Facebook also offers self-esteem maintenance 
advantages when users do receive criticism from Facebook friends. Users can escape esteem-
threatening feedback by logging off, re-reading more supportive messages posted previously, or 
by just removing the offenders from their list of friends, thereby blocking future critical postings.  
 Three features of Facebook's default settings warrant attention for steering people toward 
positive feelings and supportive commentary. First, personal pages automatically display the 
total number of Facebook friends one has accumulated, so users receive reassurance of social 
acceptance (usually by hundreds of friends) whenever they log on. Second, as Twenge and 
Campbell (2009) noted, the Facebook "friends" label confers undeserved status to relationships 
between people who often barely know each other. Third, the Facebook default screen includes a 
"Like" button that allows people to quickly express their endorsement or appreciation for 
comments or content that others post, but the default screen does not include a parallel "Dislike" 
or "Hate" button that would make it easier for people to express criticism. 
 Facebook allows people to simultaneously show off and obtain self-affirming feedback—
two features that narcissists should find especially appealing. Studies by Buffardi and Campbell 
(2008) and Mehdizadeh (2010) both found that narcissism predicted quantity of Facebook 
activity, and although Bergman, Fearrington, Davenport, and Bergman (2011) did not find the 
same relationship, they did show that narcissists were more likely to report using Facebook for 
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self-promotion.  Buffardi and Campbell proposed that exposure to others' narcissism on 
Facebook causes people to present themselves in a more narcissistic manner; perhaps it is no 
coincidence that students today are generally more narcissistic than college students in prior 
generations (Twenge, Konrath, Foster, Campbell, & Bushman, 2008).  
 Gonzales and Hancock (2011) gathered the strongest evidence to date for the notion that 
Facebook provides a self-flattering looking glass. Their research randomly assigned participants 
either to view a mirror, their personal Facebook page, or someone else's Facebook page. 
Participants who saw their own Facebook page subsequently had higher self-esteem than 
participants assigned to other experiment conditions. Gonzales and Hancock interpreted their 
results as evidence of the benefits of being able to personally craft one's Facebook image, but 
their results could also be attributed to benefits of exposure to the supportive virtual presence of 
Facebook friends.  
 Although Facebook should be a valuable social resource for people who are sociable by 
nature, the people who seem to gain the most from the alternative social interface offered by 
Facebook and other internet social networking options are those who have the most trouble 
interacting with people in face-to-face meetings. All people may benefit from connections with 
accepting others, but some people struggle to overcome fears related to social exposure and 
interaction. Individuals who are socially anxious, shy, or lack self-esteem tend to feel more 
comfortable engaging with others through an internet environment that allows them to control 
their self-presentation more easily without being overwhelmed by having to simultaneously 
grasp and respond to the complex interpersonal cues exchanged in face-to-face interactions (e.g., 
Baker & Oswald, 2010; Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2007; Joinson, 2004).7 
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 Of course, social networking does not guarantee self-esteem advantages. The Facebook 
norm of socially supportive feedback probably does not extend to the minority of users whose 
self-presentations violate standards of social appropriateness. Also, true masters of the art of 
face-to-face interaction have less to gain from the movement toward internet-based forms of 
communication. In some cases, self-esteem benefits of reflected appraisal via Facebook may be 
cancelled out by the upward comparison threats posed by exposure to seemingly thriving 
Facebook friends (e.g., Jordan et al., 2011).  
Closing thoughts 
 When compared to the history of research on some other topics relevant to self and 
identity, the reflected appraisal literature is relatively uncontentious. Early accounts of reflected 
appraisal offered by James, Cooley, and Mead have largely withstood decades of scientific 
scrutiny. Nonetheless, although consensus on the big picture of reflected appraisal has remained 
fairly stable, the complex details of reflected appraisal processes are now far better understood. 
The nature and direction of numerous biases common to reflected appraisal have been isolated, 
as have relevant individual differences in the people viewing their reflection and in those serving 
as mirrors. It will be interesting to learn whether some of the established principles of reflected 
appraisal processes will need to be revised when researchers catch up to the recent revolutionary 
changes in the tools people use to appraise themselves and others.  
 
REFLECTED APPRAISAL                                                                                                          24 
 
References 
Albright, L., Forest, C., & Reiseter, K. (2001). Acting, behaving, and the selfless basis of 
metaperception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(5), 910-921. 
Albright, L., & Malloy, T. E. (1999). Self-observation of social behavior and metaperception. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(4), 726-734. 
Ames, D. R. (2004a). Inside the mind reader's tool kit: Projection and stereotyping in mental 
state inference. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87(3), 340-353. 
Ames, D. R. (2004b). Strategies for social influence: A similarity contingency model of 
projection and stereotyping in attribute prevalence estimates. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 87(5), 573-585. 
Aron, A., Aron, E. N., Tudor, M., & Nelson, G. (1991). Close relationships as including other in 
the self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60(2), 241-253. 
Back, M. D., Stopfer, J. M., Vazire, S., Gaddis, S., Schmukle, S. C., Egloff, B., & Gosling, S. D. 
(2010). Facebook profiles reflect actual personality, not self-idealization. Psychological 
Science, 21(3), 372-374. 
Baker, L. R., & Oswald, D. L. (2010). Shyness and online social networking services. Journal of 
Social and Personal Relationships, 27(7), 873-889. 
Baldwin, M. W. (1992). Relational schemas and the processing of social information. 
Psychological Bulletin, 112(3), 461-484. 
Baldwin, M. W. (1996). Self-esteem and "if...then" contingencies of interpersonal acceptance. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(6), 1130-1141. 
REFLECTED APPRAISAL                                                                                                          25 
 
Baldwin, M. W., Carrell, S. E., & Lopez, D. F. (1990). Priming relationship schemas: My 
advisor and the Pope are watching me from the back of my mind. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 26, 435-454. 
Bargh, J. A., McKenna, K. Y. A., & Fitzsimons, G. M. (2002). Can you see the real me? 
Activation and expression of the "true self" on the internet. Journal of Social Issues, 
58(1), 33-48. 
Baron, R. M., Albright, L., & Malloy, T. E. (1995). Effects of behavioral and social class 
information on social judgment. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21(4), 308-
315. 
Baumeister, R. F. (1998). The self. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook 
of social psychology (4th ed., pp. 680-740). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., & Vohs, K. D. (2001). Bad is stronger than 
good. Review of General Psychology, 5(4), 323-370. 
Baumeister, R. F., Hutton, D. G., & Tice, D. M. (1989). Cognitive processes during deliberate 
self-presentation: How self-presenters alter and misinterpret the behavior of their 
interaction partners. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 25(1), 59-78. 
Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (2005). The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal 
attachments as a fundamental human motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 117(3), 497-529. 
Baumeister, R. F., Tice, D. M., & Hutton, D. G. (1989). Self-presentational motivations and 
personality differences in self-esteem. Journal of Personality, 57, 547-579. 
Bergman, S. M., Fearrington, M. E., Davenport, S. W., & Bergman, J. Z. (2011). Millennials, 
narcissism, and social networking: What narcissists do on social networking sites and 
why. Personality and Individual Differences, 50, 706-711. 
REFLECTED APPRAISAL                                                                                                          26 
 
Blumberg, H. H. (1972). Communication of interpersonal evaluations. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 23(2), 157-162. 
Buffardi, L. E., & Campbell, W. K. (2008). Narcissism and social networking web sites. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34(10), 1303-1314. 
Campbell, L., Simpson, J. A., Boldry, J., & Kashy, D. A. (2005). Perceptions of conflict and 
support in romantic relationships: The role of attachment anxiety. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 88(3), 510-531. 
Carlson, E. N., & Furr, R. M. (2009). Evidence of differential meta-accuracy: People understand 
the different impressions they make. Psychological Science, 20(8), 1033-1039. 
Cast, A. D., Stets, J. E., & Burke, P. J. (1999). Does the self conform to the views of others? 
Social Psychology Quarterly, 62, 68-82. 
Chambers, J. R., Epley, N., Savitsky, K., & Windschitl, P. D. (2008). Knowing too much: Using 
private knowledge to predict how one is viewed by others. Psychological Science, 19(6), 
542-548. 
Chen, S., Boucher, H. C., & Tapias, M. P. (2006). The relational self revealed: Integrative 
conceptualization and implications for interpersonal life. Psychological Bulletin, 132(2), 
151-179. 
Cioffi, D. (2000). The looking-glass self revisited: Behavior choice and self-perception in the 
social token. In T. F. Heatherton, R. E. Kleck, M. R. Hebl, & J. G. Hull (Eds.), The social 
psychology of stigma (pp. 184-219). New York: Guilford. 
Clement, R. W., & Krueger, J. (2002). Social categorization moderates social projection. Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 38(3), 219 - 231. 
Cooley, C. H. (1902). Human nature and the social order. New York: Scribner.  
REFLECTED APPRAISAL                                                                                                          27 
 
Crocker, J., Luhtanen, R. K., & Sommers, S. R. (2004). Contingencies of self-worth: Progress 
and prospects. European Review of Social Psychology, 75, 133-181. 
DePaulo, B. M., & Bell, K. L. (1996). Truth and investment: Lies are told to those who care. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(4), 703-716. 
DiDonato, T. E., Ullrich, J., & Krueger, J. I. (2011). Social perception as induction and 
inference: An integrative model of intergroup differentiation, ingroup favoritism, and 
differential accuracy. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100(1), 66-83. 
Dijksterhuis, A., & Bargh, J. A. (2001). The perception-behavior expressway: Automatic effects 
of social perception on social behavior. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental 
social psychology (Vol. 33, pp. 1-40). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Drigotas, S. M., Rusbult, C. E., Wieselquist, J., & Whitton, S. W. (1999). Close partner as 
sculptor of the ideal self: Behavioral affirmation and the Michelangelo phenomenon. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 293-323. 
Dunning, D. (2005). Self-insight: Roadblocks and detours on the path to knowing thyself. New 
York: Psychology Press. 
Ellison, N. B., Steinfield, C., & Lampe, C. (2007). The benefits of Facebook "friends:" Social 
capital and college students' use of online social network sites. Journal of Computer-
Mediated Communication, 12, 1143-1168. 
Epley, N., Keysar, B., Van Boven, L., Gilovich, T. (2004). Perspective taking as egocentric 
anchoring and adjustment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87(3), 327-339. 
Facebook press release. http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics, accessed March 11, 
2011. 
REFLECTED APPRAISAL                                                                                                          28 
 
Felson, F. B. (1989). Parents and the reflected appraisal process: A longitudinal analysis. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 56(6), 965-971. 
Felson, R. B. (1993). The (somewhat) social self: How others affect self-appraisals. In J. M. Suls 
(Ed.), The self in social perspective (pp. 1-26). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Fenigstein, A. (1979). Self-consciousness, self-attention, and social interaction. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 37(1), 75-86. 
Frey, F. E., & Tropp, L. R. (2006). Being seen as individuals versus as group members: 
Extending research on metaperception to intergroup contexts. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 10(3), 265-280. 
Gilbert, D. T., & Krull, D. S. (1988). Seeing less and knowing more: The benefits of perceptual 
ignorance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54(2), 193-202. 
Gilbert, D. T., Jones, E. E., & Pelham, B. W. (1987). Influence and inference: What the active 
perceiver overlooks. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52(5), 861-870. 
Gilbert, D. T., & Malone, P. S. (1995). The correspondence bias. Psychological Bulletin, 117(1), 
21-38. 
Gilovich, T., Savitsky, K., & Medvec, V. H. (1998). The illusion of transparency: Biased 
assessments of others' ability to read one's emotional states. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 75(2), 332-346. 
Gonzales, A. L., & Hancock, J. T. (2011). Mirror, mirror on my Facebook: Effects of exposure 
to Facebook on self-esteem. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, 14, 79-
83. 
REFLECTED APPRAISAL                                                                                                          29 
 
Gromet, D. M., & Pronin, E. (2009). What were you worried about? Actors’ concerns about 
revealing fears and insecurities relative to observers’ reactions. Self and Identity, 8, 342-
364. 
Harter, S. (1999). The construction of self. New York: Guilford. 
Harter, S., Stocker, C., & Robinson, N. S. (1996). The perceived directionality of the link 
between approval and self-worth: The liabilities of a looking glass self-orientation among 
young adolescents. Journal of Research on Adolescence, 6(3), 285-308. 
Heine, S. J., Takemoto, T., Moskalenko, S., Lasaleta, J., & Henrich, J. (2008). Mirrors in the 
head: Cultural variation in objective self-awareness. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 34(7), 879-887. 
Higgins, E. T., & Pittman, T. S. (2008). Motives of the human animal: Comprehending, 
managing, and sharing inner states. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 361-385. 
Ickes, W. J. (1997). Empathic accuracy. New York: Guilford. 
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. New York: Holt. 
Joinson, A. N. (2004). Self-esteem, interpersonal risk, and preference for E-mail to face-to-face 
communication. CyberPsychology and Behavior, 7(4), 472-478. 
Jones. E. E. (1986). Interpreting interpersonal behavior: The effects of expectancies. Science, 
234, 41-46. 
Jordan, A. H., Monin, B., Dweck, C. S., Lovett, B. J., John, O. P., & Gross, J. J. (2011). Misery 
has more company than people think: Underestimating the prevalence of others' negative 
emotions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37(1), 120-135. 
Jussim, L. (1993). Accuracy in interpersonal expectations: A reflection-construction analysis of 
current and classic research. Journal of Personality, 61(4), 637-668. 
REFLECTED APPRAISAL                                                                                                          30 
 
Jussim, L. (2005). Accuracy in social perception: Criticisms, controversies, criteria, components, 
and cognitive processes. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social 
psychology (Vol. 37, pp. 1-93). San Diego, CA: Elsevier. 
Jussim, L., & Harber, K. D. (2005). Teacher expectations and self-fulfilling prophecies: Knowns 
and unknowns, resolved and unresolved controversies. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 9(2), 131-155. 
Jussim, L., Harber, K. D., Crawford, J. T., Cain, T. R., & Cohen, F. (2005). Social reality makes 
the social mind: Self-fulfilling prophecy, stereotypes, bias, and accuracy. Interaction 
Studies, 6(1), 85-102. 
Jussim, L., Soffin, S., Brown, R., Ley, J., & Kohlhepp, K. (1992). Understanding reactions to 
feedback by integrating ideas from symbolic interactionism and cognitive evaluation 
theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62(3), 402-421. 
Kaplan, S. A., Santuzzi, A. M., & Ruscher, J. B. (2009). Elaborative metaperceptions in 
outcome-dependent situations: The diluted relationship between default self-perceptions 
and metaperceptions. Social Cognition, 27(4), 601-614. 
Kelly, A. E. (2000). Helping construct desirable identities: A self-presentational view of 
psychotherapy. Psychological Bulletin, 126, 475-494. 
Kelly, A. E., & Rodriguez, R. R. (2006). Publicly committing oneself to an identity. Basic and 
Applied Social Psychology, 28(2), 185-191. 
Kenny, D. A., & DePaulo, B. M. (1993). Do people know how others view them? An empirical 
and theoretical account. Psychological Bulletin, 114(1), 145-161. 
REFLECTED APPRAISAL                                                                                                          31 
 
Kernis, M. H., Paradise, A. W., Whitaker, D. J., Wheatman, S. R., & Goldman, B. N. (2000). 
Master of one's psychological domain? Not likely if one's self-esteem is unstable. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26(10), 1297-1305. 
Khanna, N. (2010). "If you're half black, you're just black": Reflected appraisals and the 
persistence of the one-drop rule. Sociological Quarterly, 51, 96-121. 
Kraut, R. E., Patterson, M., Lundmark, V., Kiesler, S., Mukhopadhyay, T., & Scherlis, W. (1998). 
Internet paradox: A social technology that reduces social involvement and psychological 
well-being? American Psychologist, 53(9), 1017-1032. 
Krueger, J. I. (1998). On the perception of social consensus. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in 
experimental social psychology (Vol. 30, pp. 163-240). San Diego, CA: Elsevier. 
Krueger, J. I. (2007). From social projection to social behavior. European Review of Social 
Psychology, 18, 1-35. 
Kruger, J., Epley, N., Parker, J., & Ng, Z. (2005). Egocentrism over E-mail: Can we 
communicate as well as we think? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89(6), 
925-936. 
Leary, M. R., & Baumeister, R. F. (2000). The nature and function of self-esteem: Sociometer 
theory. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 32, pp. 1-
62). San Diego, CA: Academic Press 
Leary, M. R., Haupt, A. L., Strausser, K. S., & Chokel, J. T. (1998). Calibrating the sociometer: 
The relationship between interpersonal appraisals and state self-esteem. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 74(5), 1290-1299. 
REFLECTED APPRAISAL                                                                                                          32 
 
Leary, M. R., Tambor, E. S., Terdal, S. K., & Downs, D. L. (1995). Self-esteem as an 
interpersonal monitor: The sociometer hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 68(3), 518-530. 
Lemay, E. P., & Clark, M. S. (2008). "Walking on eggshells": How expressing relationship 
insecurities perpetuates them. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(2), 420-
441. 
Lemay, E. P., & Dudley, K. L. (2009). Implications of reflected appraisals of interpersonal 
insecurity for suspicion and power. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35(12), 
1672-1686. 
Lenhart, A., Purcell, K., Smith, A., & Zickuhr, K. Social media and young adults. Pew Internet 
& American Life Project, February 3, 2010, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Social-Media-and-Young-Adults.aspx, 
accessed on March 11, 2011. 
Levesque, M. J. (1997). Meta-accuracy among acquainted individuals: A social relations analysis 
of interpersonal perception and metaperception. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 72(1), 66-74. 
Lundgren, D. C. (2004). Social feedback and self-appraisals: Current status of the Mead-Cooley 
hypothesis. Symbolic Interaction, 27(2), 267-286. 
Madon, S., Jussim, L., & Eccles, J. (1997). In search of the powerful self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72(4), 791-809. 
Malloy, T. E., Albright, L., Scarpati, S. (2007). Awareness of peers' judgments of oneself: 
Accuracy and process of metaperception. International Journal of Behavioral 
Development, 31(6), 603-610. 
REFLECTED APPRAISAL                                                                                                          33 
 
Marks, G., & Miller, N. (1987). Ten years of research on the false-consensus effect: An 
Empirical and theoretical review. Psychological Bulletin, 102(1), 72-90. 
McNulty, J. K. (2008). Neuroticism and interpersonal negativity: The independent contributions 
of perceptions and behaviors. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34(11), 1439-
1450. 
McNulty, S. E., & Swann, W. B. (1994). Identity negotiation in roommate relationships: The self 
as architect and consequence of social reality. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 67, 1012-1023. 
Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Mehdizadeh, S. (2010). Self-presentation 2.0: Narcissism and self-esteem on Facebook. 
Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, 13(4), 357-364. 
Murray, S. L., Griffin, D. W., Rose, P., & Bellavia, G. M. (2003). Calibrating the sociometer: 
The relational contingencies of self-esteem. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 85(1), 63-84. 
Murray, S. L., Holmes, J. G., & Griffin, D. W. (1996). The self-fulfilling nature of positive 
illusions in romantic relationships: Love is not blind, but prescient. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 1155-1180. 
Murray, S. L., Holmes, J. G., Griffin, D. W., Bellavia, G., & Rose, P. (2001). The mis-measure 
of love: How self-doubt contaminates relationship beliefs. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 27(4), 423-436. 
Murray, S. L., Holmes, J. G., MacDonald, G., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1998). Through the looking 
glass darkly? When self-doubts turn into relationship insecurities. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 75(6), 1459-1480. 
REFLECTED APPRAISAL                                                                                                          34 
 
Murray, S. L., Rose, P., Bellavia, G. M., Holmes, J. G., & Kusche, A. G. (2002). When rejection 
stings: How self-esteem constrains relationship-enhancement processes. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 83(3), 56-573. 
NielsenWire. What Americans do online: Social media and games dominate activity, August 2, 
2010. http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online_mobile/what-americans-do-online-
social-media-and-games-dominate-activity/, accessed March 11, 2011. 
O'Connor, B. P., & Dyce, J. (1993). Appraisals of musical ability in bar bands: Identifying the 
weak link in the looking-glass self chain. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 14(1), 
69-86. 
Oltmanns, T. F., Gleason, M. E. J., Klonsky, E. D., & Turkheimer, E. (2005). Meta-perception 
for pathological personality traits: Do we know when others think that we are difficult? 
Consciousness and Cognition, 14, 739-751. 
Pasupathi, M., & Rich, B. (2005). Inattentive listening undermines self-verification in personal 
storytelling. Journal of Personality, 73(4), 1051-1085. 
Pempek, T. A., Yermolayeva, Y. A., & Calvert, S. L. (2009). College students' social networking 
experiences on Facebook. Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 30, 227-238. 
Pfeifer, J. H., Masten, C. L., Borofsky, L. A., Dapretto, M., Fuligni, A. J., & Liberman, M. D. 
(2009). Neural correlates of direct and reflected self-appraisals in adolescents and adults: 
When social perspective-taking informs self-perception. Child Development, 80(4), 1016-
1038. 
Preuss, G. S., & Alicke, M. D. (2009). Everybody loves me: Self-evaluations and 
metaperceptions of dating popularity. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35(7), 
937-950. 
REFLECTED APPRAISAL                                                                                                          35 
 
Roberts, L. M., Dutton, J. E., Spreitzer, G. M., Heaphy, E. D., & Quinn, R. E. (2005). 
Composing the reflected best-self portrait: Building pathways for becoming extraordinary 
in work organizations. Academy of Management Review, 30(4), 712-736. 
Rosenberg, M. (1973). Which significant others? American Behavioral Scientist, 16, 829-860. 
Rosenthal, R., & Rubin, D. B. (1978). Interpersonal expectancy effects: The first 345 studies. 
Behavioral and Brain Studies, 1(3), 377-415. 
Ross, L., Greene, D., & House, P. (1977). The false consensus effect: An egocentric bias in 
social perception and attribution processes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
13(3), 279-301. 
Sanitioso, R. B., & Wlodarski, R. (2004). In search of information that confirms a desired self-
perception: Motivated processing of social feedback and choice of social interactions. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(4), 412-422. 
Santuzzi, A. M., & Ruscher, J. B. (2002). Stigma salience and paranoid social cognition: 
Understanding variability in metaperceptions among individuals with recently-acquired 
stigma. Social Cognition, 20(3), 171-197. 
Schlenker, B. R., Dlugolecki, D. W., & Doherty, K. (1994). The impact of self-presentations on 
self-appraisals and behavior: The power of public commitment. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 20, 20-33. 
Schmader, T., Johns, M., & Forbes, C. (2008). An integrated process model of stereotype threat 
effects on performance. Psychological Review, 115(2), 336-356. 
Schoeneman, T. J. (1981). Reports of the sources of self-knowledge. Journal of Personality, 
49(3), 284-294. 
REFLECTED APPRAISAL                                                                                                          36 
 
Sedikides, C., & Skowronski, J. J. (1995). On the sources of self-knowledge: The perceived 
primacy of self-reflection. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 14(3), 244-270. 
Shah, J. (2003a). Automatic for the people: How representations of significant others implicitly 
affect goal pursuit. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84(4), 661-681. 
Shah, J. (2003b). The motivational looking glass: How significant others implicitly affect goal 
appraisals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(3), 424-439. 
Sherman, R. C., End, C., Kraan, E., Cole, A., Campbell, J., Klausner, J., & Birchmeier, Z. (2001). 
Metaperception in cyberspace. CyberPsychology and Behavior, 4(1), 123-129. 
Shrauger, J. S. (1975). Responses to evaluation as a function of initial self-perceptions. 
Psychological Bulletin, 82(4), 581-596. 
Shrauger, J. S., & Schoeneman, T. J. (1979). Symbolic interactionist view of self-concept: 
Through the looking glass darkly. Psychological Bulletin, 86(3), 549-573. 
Sinclair, S., Huntsinger, J., Skorinko, J., & Hardin, C. D. (2005). Social tuning of the self: 
Consequences for the self-evaluations of stereotype targets. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 89(2), 160-175. 
Srivastava, S., & Beer, J. S. (2005). How self-evaluations relate to being liked by others: 
Integrating sociometer and attachment perspectives. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 89(6), 966-977. 
Suh, E. M. (2007). Downsides of an overly context-sensitive self: Implications from the culture 
and subjective well-being research. Journal of Personality, 75(6), 1321-1343. 
Swann, W. B., Bosson, J. K., & Pelham, B. W. (2002). Different partners, different selves: 
Strategic verification of circumscribed identities. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 28(9), 1215-1228.  
REFLECTED APPRAISAL                                                                                                          37 
 
Swann, W. B., & Read, S. J. (1981). Acquiring self-knowledge: The search for feedback that fits. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41(6), 1119-1128. 
Tafarodi , R. W., Lo, C., Yamaguchi, S., Lee, W., & Katsura, H. (2004). The inner self in three 
countries. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 35(1), 97-117. 
Taylor, P., & Keeter, S. Millennials: A portrait of generation next. Pew Internet & American Life 
Project, February, 2010, http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/millennials-confident-
connected-open-to-change.pdf, accessed on March 11, 2011. 
Tice, D. M. (1992). Self-presentation and self-concept change: The looking-glass self is also a 
magnifying glass. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 435-451. 
Tice, D. M., & Wallace, H. M. (2003). The reflected self: Creating ourselves as (you think) 
others see you. In M. R. Leary & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self and identity (pp. 
91-105). New York: Guilford. 
Tong, S. T., van der Heide, B., Langwell, L., & Walther, J. B. (2008). Too much of a good 
thing? The relationship between number of friends and interpersonal impressions on 
Facebook. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 13, 531-549. 
Turner, J. C., & Onorato, R. S. (1999). Social identity, personality, and the self-concept: A self-
categorization perspective. In T. R. Tyler, R. M. Kramer, & O. P. John (Eds.), The 
psychology of the social self (pp. 11-46). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Twenge, J. M., & Campbell, W. K. (2009). The narcissism epidemic: Living in the age of 
entitlement. New York: Free Press. 
Twenge, J. M., Konrath, S., Foster, J. D., Campbell, W. K., & Bushman, B. J. (2008). Further 
evidence of an increase in narcissism among college students. Journal of Personality, 
76(4), 919-928. 
REFLECTED APPRAISAL                                                                                                          38 
 
Uysal, A., Lin, H. L., & Knee, C. R. (2010). The role of need satisfaction in self-concealment 
and well-being. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(2), 187-199. 
Vorauer, J. D., & Cameron, J. J. (2002). So close, and yet so far: Does collectivism foster 
transparency overestimation? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83(6), 1344-
1352. 
Vorauer, J. D., & Ross, M. (1999). Self-awareness and feeling transparent: Failing to suppress 
one's self. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35, 415-440. 
Walther (2009). Self-generated versus other-generated statements in computer-mediated 
communication: A test of warranting theory using Facebook. Communication Research, 
36(2), 229-253. 
Weisbuch, M., Sinclair, S. A., Skorinko, J. L., & Eccleston, C. P. (2009). Self-esteem depends on 
the beholder: Effects of a subtle social value cue. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 45, 143-148. 
Wu, S., & Keysar, B. (2007). The effect of culture on perspective taking. Psychological Science, 
18(7), 600-606. 
Zhao, S. (2005). The digital self: Through the looking glass of telecopresent others. Symbolic 
Interaction, 28(3), 387-405. 
Zhao, S. (2006). The Internet and the transformation of the reality of everyday life: Toward a 
new analytic stance in sociology. Sociological Inquiry, 76(4), 458-474. 
Zhao, S., Grasmuch, S., & Martin, J. (2008). Identity construction on Facebook: Digital 
empowerment in anchored relationships. Computers in Human Behavior, 24, 1816-1836. 
 
 
REFLECTED APPRAISAL                                                                                                          39 
 
Figure Caption 
Figure 1. Components of reflected appraisal. 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
 1 Reflected appraisal is typically framed as a subcomponent or manifestation of symbolic 
interactionism, but the terms are sometimes used interchangeably. 
 2 Scholars have rarely focused on distinctions between cognitive and emotional 
dimensions of reflected appraisal; this chapter likewise infers both dimensions in referring to 
views, judgments, and appraisals of and by self and others. 
 3 Some authors have used the reflected appraisal label narrowly to refer to 
metaperception; our broader conceptualization of reflected appraisal encompasses both 
metaperception and the self-appraisals that influence and result from metaperception. 
 4 One might question how self-views could be changed by metaperceptions if the 
metaperceptions were based on self-views. In this case, concluding that others share one's views 
of self should change self-views by strengthening the confidence with which they are held.   
 5 As Murray et al. (1998) noted, if low self-esteem is indeed a symptom of not feeling 
socially accepted, it is sadly ironic that low self-esteem individuals have such difficulty 
accepting the validity of others' expressions of acceptance.  
 6 The terms "self-stereotyping" or "metastereotyping" are sometimes used to describe 
cases of reflected appraisal in which people judge themselves in accordance with the stereotypes 
they associate with the group(s) to which they belong.  
 7 Some early research on the psychological consequences of internet use—before internet 
use became mainstream behavior—suggested that the socially skilled benefit more from the 
internet than the socially inept (e.g., Kraut et al., 1998), but the opposite pattern has typically 
been found in more recent research.   
 
